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It would seem to us that perhaps it
was really not literature but painting
for which he was destined from
childhood…
Vladimir Nabokov, The Gift
After all we should keep in mind that
literature is not a pattern of  i d e a s  but
a pattern of  i m a g e s.
Vladimir Nabokov, Lectures on Russian Literature
Sight is both image and word;
the gaze possible both because of the enunciations
of articulate eyes  a n d  because the subject
finds a position to see within the optics
and grammar of language.
Peggy Phelan, Unmarked: The Politics of Performance
In the narrative realm, the Oedipal myth or the radical negation
of the ocular truth demands at least two violent changes of the pro-
tagonist’s view: first by self-punishment for the act of incest (made
possible by Oedipus’ inner blindness; regardless of his otherwise
healthy eyes), and then by the “recognition” of a new ethical and
political order (made possible by Oedipus’ inner insight; regardless
of his actual loss of sight). In other words, the Theban hero is the
king of paradoxical anti-visual violence presented as “necessary”
for attaining liberty and knowledge, as well as the king of  i n -
s i g h t  “paid for” with  v i o l e n c e .  Oedipus stands for a cruel
(representational) revolution; a change that was communicated by
homicide and suicidal self-mutilation. However, the ethical twist in
the story is connected with the hero’s gain of the ontological “hear-
ing” (comprehension); hearing as final acceptance of himself as the
Other. And an absolute other at that – the enemy of the whole com-
munity. Through the ear Oedipus also attains feminisation, since
the ear has been traditionally considered as a substitute for the dis-
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placed female uterus as well as for the “passivity” of mere listening
(Phelan 1993: 55). The narrative symmetry therefore follows the
pattern: when Oedipus stops being a Penetrating Eye, he becomes a
Receptive Ear. Economy of this painful transfer saves his – now
androgynous – identity. Another important character included in
the Oedipal fiction, wise Tiresias, serves as a model for androgyny
equally “paid for” with blindness. As we know from Ovid’s Meta-
morphoses (book III), Tiresias, who has experienced sexual inter-
course with both men and women, lost his sight as a punishment
by Juno for disagreeing with her judgement that men enjoy sex
more than women.
Thus it is possible to say that blindness turns Oedipus into Tire-
sias’ Doppelgänger; into another ambivalent, doublesexed self. Fe-
minist criticism justly had a lot to say about “male gaze” and the
historical “masculinity” of vision that objectifies women’s body
(Mulvey 1975; Lauretis 1984; Irigaray 1985; Williams 1989; Fre-
edman 1991; Kaplan 1996), but the veil of silence still hovers over
an unacknowledged semantic capability of patriarchal gaze to turn
against itself and become self-reflexive and therefore self-critical.
And this consciousness of “others” audible within ourselves, and
here I agree with Emmanuel Lévinas (Lévinas 1996), is the utmost
ethical and the most responsible identity-position. But is it possible
to let the others be visible within ourselves, with equal ethical re-
flections and consequences?
II
Let us examine the face behind the masks of this particular
analytical investigation: Nabokov’s literary theory, expressed in his
seminal writings on literature. It has already been sufficiently pro-
ven (most recently by Thomas Seifrid, 1996) that Vladimir Nabo-
kov in all his literary works favoured visual over aural: it is his “vi-
sual absolutism” that establishes the link between Nabokov and
both the Russian Symbolist movement and the Leo Tolstoy’s “to
see is to be” kind of aesthetic. In Strong Opinions explains his ele-
mentary aversion to aural art of music and listening:
I have no ear for music, a shortcoming I deplore bitterly. When I
attend a concert – which happens about once in five years – I
endeavour gamely to follow the sequence and relationship of sounds
but cannot keep it up for more than a few minutes. Visual impression,
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reflection of hands in lacquered wood, a diligent bad spot over a fid-
dle, these take over, and soon I am bored beyond measure by the mo-
tions of the musicians (Nabokov 1990: 35).
Deliberately ambiguous artistic images in the case of Nabokov’s
writing style are so much privileged over the discourse and over
verbal and philosophical explanations that this craving for the in-
tense pictorial polysemy becomes a literary method:
As an artist and scholar I prefer the specific detail to the generali-
sation, images to ideas, obscure facts to clear symbols, and the disco-
vered wild fruit to the synthetic jam (id., 7).
In Nabokov’s story Sounds (Nabokov 1995a [1923]), fictional
dramaturgy includes the hero’s journey from agitated listening of
Bach’s music towards peaceful silence. Bach (and all  m u s i c) is
presented as beautiful, divine, exciting, but none the less as a
f a l s e l y  u n i f y i n g  f o r c e, against which we have the contrast:
the image of the tears from the face of the hero’s friend –  a  v i -
s u a l  O t h e r  that breaks the aural harmony of music and self
being “one”. Sight is therefore constructed as a principle of me-
taphysical deferring and differentiation (différance, in Derrida’s
glossary). Music is furthermore equated with erotic love and “unity
in sound” and “unity in love” are both seen as a threat of total as-
similation/identification, from where the hero escapes into the si-
lent, and not very open relationship with his male friend. In the
story Music (Nabokov 1995 [1932]) the concert is only a golden
opportunity for the protagonist Victor to stare at performers and
mysterious faces in the audience. The Nabokovian cult of images
shapes the very specific ontological situation: Oedipal stare into
the taboo of some sort of an Unpenetrable Secret; “silenced” visual
scene that finally outroars the concerto itself. This is the author’s
filmic imagination at work – Lolita’s prolonged life on the large
screen supports our thesis sufficiently enough.
But Ada (Nabokov 1990c [1969]) is probably the most elaborate
Nabokov celebration of the visual primacy over the word: “Ad” is
the Russian word for “hell”, while “ardor”, from the the subtitle of
the novel and from Ada’s nickname, connotes the hero’s passion
and sexual ecstasy. It is the chronicle of all the infernal pleasures
at Ardis Hall generated from Van’s visual fascination with Ada’s
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childlike physical beauty and described with the designer’s eye for
the details of her body shape, her ardour, hairstyle, taste and way of
dressing. Just as Lolita was prey to Humbert Humbert’s visual
fixation, so Ada is submitted to Van’s constant scopic scanning.
Nabokov/lepidopterist is here to observe his favourite “insect”
(and his favourite incest) and Nabokov/painter is here to copy his
favourite model. As if displaying wilfully under the full blow of
feminist criticism, or maybe engage personally in the deconstruc-
tion of the male gaze, Nabokov provides Ada with a career in the
film industry: she plays the role of the “dancing girl Dolores” (ho-
mage to Lolita’s full name) in the movie called Don Juan’s Last
Fling. Not only does Van get pleasure from objectifying Ada into
moving pictures, but the whole movie-audience is casted as scopic
collaborator as well. The main part of Van’s intense sexual excite-
ment therefore arises from the fact that Ada is “the most perfect”
visual object. She is also a sexy and “forbidden” Jocasta-like va-
riation, only without the incestuous guilt.
There is no punishment for Ada’s and Van’s obsessive sensual
symbiosis – the novel ends with the two of them looking at their
own photographs (again, privileged images take over the narra-
tion). At that point, Ada is ninety five and Van is ninety seven
years old. Lifelong “perversion” (or should we conclude that “true
love” always remains somehow unlawful and manneristically in-
sane?) hence becomes panegirically sanctified; Nabokovian Oedi-
pus remains happily blind to the societal order. His vision not only
escapes the Oedipal matrix of Western literary heritage (by mime-
sis triumphing over any painful catharsis); it lashes out at Biblical
or the Eden narrative content just as fiercely. Ada brings no pu-
nishment, no shame and no eternal Fall. Bodies are happily naked
and the magical garden of childhood imagination is at their
disposal.
Ada also contains many references to the Proustian subject of
the nature of time, especially in Van’s study called The Texture of
Time. As we know from Speak, Memory (Nabokov 1969) and
Strong Opinions (Nabokov 1990 [1973]), Nabokov’s relationship
with pater tempus focused on the art of memory as the art of visual
memory:
WHEN THE EYE REFUSES TO BLIND ITSELF… 239
I would say that imagination is a form of memory. Down, Plato,
down, good dog. An image depends on the power of association, and
association is supplied and prompted by memory (id., 78).
To remember is the same as to see, to see (in our mind’s eye) is
to remember. With so much attention given to the eyes, there is no
doubt that Nabokovian Platonic villains suffer from a listening
disorder – being enslaved to the visual leaves one almost indiffe-
rent to other people’s voices. A paradigmatic example is Humbert
Humbert’s “deafness” to Lolita’s cries.
But Nabokov is never simply immoral; his iconophilic and edu-
cated literary criminals more often than not “lose” or are defeated
on symbolic and ethical grounds. As far as Ada goes, if there is any
human or godly disapproval or objection to Van’s and Ada’s in-
cestuous community (maybe even a motion to expel the lovers
from the heavenly site), nobody is there to hear it.
In my opinion, Ada is the only Nabokov novel that transcends
the ethical through the acclamation of aestethical: love and the lo-
ve of art are presented as fantastically victorious over the plagues
of plain everyday existence and common law. To wit, the theme of
painful Oedipal combination of exile and blindness does reappear
often in Nabokov’s other Russian and American novels as well.
For instance, art gallerist Kretschmar in Camera Obscura (1932)
loses his sight in a car accident, and the object of his adulterous
gaze, cheap prostitute Magda who dreams of becoming a celebra-
ted movie star, “punishes” the blinded one even further. Still vi-
sually obsessive, Kretschmar ends being murdered by Magda.
His most significant fault, however, has nothing to do with his
sexual persona. In Nabokov’s mind, Kretschmar is guilty of being
“competent, but not brilliant” (Nabokov’s Russian version of the
novel quoted according to Medarić 1989: 123). He is condemned
for being mediocre. As we know from Nabokov writings on Gogol
(Nabokov 1961), the frame of mind the writer despised the most is
exactly “the average” or “the common” type; just as he considered
poshlost or triviality the greatest possible evil. In other words, Na-
bokov’s credo might be formulated as follows: daring to shift the
inner or social boundary while still communicating with the Other
within oneself results in protection of the hero’s sight (case study:
hermaphroditic play as part of Ada’s and Van’s metonimical and
metaphorical relationship in Ada); and to fear the consequences of
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one’s eccentricity brings the peril of blindness and death (case
study: Kretschmar in Camera obscura).
Just like Ada and Van, each other’s doubles, Kretschmar too
has his own “opposite twin”, Horn. Unlike the mirroring
reflections exchanged between the incestuous lovers, Kretschmar
is unable to address Horn as his braver, more eccentric and daring
side. In Nabokov’s oeuvre there are many novels that narrate the
disability of hero’s eye to blind itself in the sense of becoming Oe-
dipally self-critical or self-reflexive (cathartic). In The Defence, In-
vitation to a Beheading, Lolita, Bend Sinister, Pnin, Pale Fire,
Transparent Things and Look at the Harlequins! visual obsessions
capture or ruin the protagonist because he is trapped in endless,
monolithically and monologically obsessive repetition: frames
within frames of the same visual representations; Referential ma-
nia, as Nabokov (Nabokov 1997: 599) names the disease of a cha-
racter from the story Signs and Symbols. Using different scholarly
terminology, it has been noted that Nabokov as a storyteller, chess-
player or lepidopterist usually works through limitless visual ob-
servation and pattern variation (cf. Alter 1970: 45). But the usual
way for Nabokov to break the Oedipal pattern of self-denial leads
to the submission of his literary protagonist to self-scrutinising
even before the outer and/ or inner catastrophe (the plague) has de-
manded it. Images are not mute, languageless objects: they are sub-
jects that constantly call for translation into the verbal interpreta-
tion, being unseparable from the language semiosis (Boehm 1997:
67, 74, 76, 77). Nabokov develops the theme of excessive attention
given to the translation process called “images to memory” that
soon becomes another “prison cage” for the hero; a confusing, de-
ceitful game of autistic self-reflections. First Nabokov’s novel,
Mashenka, portrays the hero’s fear of direct confrontation with the
object of his obsession: throughout the whole novel Ganin is ga-
thering strength to confront his first love Mashenka (Mary in En-
glish translation), but at the very end of the story he nevertheless
decides not to meet her face to face at the railway station. Ganin
refuses to meet the concrete Mashenka because, as Nabokov
(1988: 91) says, “he exhausted his memories” and what he was in
love with were only his own lonely visions; not the real girl, Ma-
shenka. Maybe we could conclude that Nabokov’s œuvre begins
with the visually obsessive hero who prefers desire supplements
(and infinite prolonging of the desire consumption) over the real/
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actual meeting-point with the Other, though, in a much later novel,
Ada, similarly visually obsessive protagonist gathers some strength
and faces the fantastic kaleidoscope of his imaginary “otherness”,
thereby parting with the emotional and intellectual economy of the
isolated self.
III
In Nabokov’s lectures and/or writings about literature, where
“literature” is synonymous with novels of the XIXth and early
XXth centuries,  s i g h t  is again and again praised as the most pre-
cious means of penetration into the work’s meaning. To see all, to
visualise every detail: that is what Vladimir Nabokov repeatedly
demanded from his students. The method hence resembles “close
reading” in a sense that it requires an absolute attention to be paid
by the reader to the details of the novel’s setting. Nabokov opens
his Lectures on Literature (Nabokov 1980), a book devoted to Eu-
ropean literary heritage, with the account of Jane Austen’s Mans-
field Park. For the openly chauvinistic Nabokov, Austen’s novel is
given as “the lowest” point of European literary spectrum. In the
famous Nabokov-Wilson letters (Karlinsy 1978), Nabokov’s entry
of 5 May 1950 (reply to Wilson’s suggestion that Austin should be
included in the soon-to-be-started Nabokov’s Cornell lectures)
reads like this:
Thanks for the suggestion concerning my fiction course. I dislike
Jane, and am prejudiced, in fact, against all women writers. They are
in another class.
While discussing Nabokov we must never forget the writer’s
misogynist stripes, a trade that makes him a far inferior thinker,
ethically speaking, to some of his own literary favourites, and by
that I mean authors such as Shakespeare or Pushkin (both of whom
are capable of admitting and expressing women’s intellectual po-
wer). However, by the May 15th 1950 Nabokov did change his
mind slightly about Austin, but only to include Mansfield Park at
the beginning of the course and to describe her to the students with
comments like:
Mansfield Park, on the other hand, is the work of a lady and the game
of a child. But from that workbasket comes exquisite needlework art,
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and there is a streak of marvellous genius in that child (Nabokov
1980: 10).
In patriarchal imagination, women are simply not capable of
having a grown-up mind. It is kind of entertaining to think of Na-
bokov’s misogynist philosophy while keeping in our adult minds
the comment made about another great women-hater, Plato. “The
philosopher wants to forget – wants to prove – his female origins –
illusory” (Diamond 1997: XI). But does he succeed? Well, judging
by the female titles of Nabokov’s novels (Mary, Lolita, Ada) we
can safely say he does not. Now back to lectures.
What emerges as impressive from Nabokov’s descriptive pe-
dantry is the fact that the Russian emigrant and Cornell professor is
very careful to treat every novel as an über-historical document; as
a “higher truth”;  t r u e  f i c t i o n. This is his typical formalist ap-
proach:
The ball at Mansfield Park is held on Thursday the twenty-second of
December, and if we look through old calendars, we will see that
only in 1808 could 22 December fall on Thursday. Fanny Price, the
young heroine of the novel, will be eighteen by that time. She arrived
at Mansfield Park in 1800 at the age of ten. King George III, a rather
weird figure, was on the throne (Nabokov 1980: 11).
In other words, novels are not “social luxury” nor “mere lacking
in imagination”; novels are serious matter, where every detail is of
utmost importance. Personally, I also choose to think that the lectu-
rer without the belief in the power of fiction should never take a
step toward a university rostrum. The effort Nabokov makes to
persuade his students that all great novels are in fact “fairy tales”
(cf. id., 2, 10, 125, 133, 270; Nabokov 1981: 103; Nabokov 1983:
1) also springs from the trust in transformative emotional power of
fairy tales world: we are reminded that our chilhood feelings of
delight about fiction were wise, long-lasting and proper. In Claris-
sa Pincola Estes’ anthropological study on fairy tales, called Wo-
men Who Run With the Wolves (Estes 1997), we find very similar
faith in the healing power of a story framed as a fairy tale, which
paradoxically makes Nabokov even closer to the feminist revalu-
ation of the sensual and corporeal aspects of literature.
Besides encouraging his own and his students’ emotional parti-
cipation in the work of art, Nabokov as a lecturer also liked to play
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the part of a Holmes-like expert in “pure and rational logic” of li-
terary analysis. He literally sees himself in a role of a “detective”
(“My course, among other things, is a kind of detective investiga-
tion of the mystery of literary structures”; Nabokov 1980: 1) and
the Holmesian magnifying glass is meant  t o  d i s c o v e r  the gre-
atest possible number of  v i s u a l  t r a c e s  in the story. A good
novel is expected to be a rich and minute image-painting. That is
why Jane Austin is not a teacher’s pet.
Her imagery is subdued. Although here and there she paints graceful
word pictures with her delicate brush on a little bit of ivory (as she
said herself), the imagery in relation to landscapes, gestures, colours,
and so on, is very restrained (id., 56).
No wonder Virginia Woolf is a non-existent entity for Nabokov:
it would probably lead to a complete revision of his chauvinist po-
etics of vision to admit that a visually hyperevocative writer could
actually appear in the female gender. Dickens, on the other hand,
wins Nabokov’s literary contest (id., 63):
In our dealings with Jane Austen we had to make a certain effort in
order to join the ladies in the drawing room. In the case of Dickens
we remain at table with our tawny port (…). If it were possible I
would like to devote the fifty minutes of every class meeting to mute
meditation, concentration, and admiration of Dickens (id., 64).
What stands at the centre of Nabokov’s interest for Dickens are,
as we might expect, the older writer’s visual feasts.
Weevle complains to Guppy about the atmosphere – mental and
physical – in that room. Mark the candle heavily burning with a great
cabbage head and a long winding sheet. No use reading Dickens if
one cannot visualise that (id., 79).
And than the explosion of admiration for Dickens’ descriptive
talent:
The first thing that we notice about the style of Dickens is his
intensely sensuous imagery, his art of vivid sensuous evocation (id.,
113).
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Here we also find Nabokov’s “translational” definitions of  v i -
s u a l i t y  a s  l i t e r a r i n e s s ,  a n d  l i t e r a r i n e s s  a s  v i -
s u a l i t y. I apologise to the reader for the considerable length of
the coming quotation and humbly promise it to be pregnant with
significance:
Literature consists, in fact, not of general ideas but  o f  p a r t i -
c u l a r  r e v e l a t i o n s, not of a school of thought but of individuals
of genius. Literature is not about something: it is the thing itself, the
quiddity. Without the masterpiece, literature does not exist. The pas-
sage describing the harbor at Dealoccurs at the point when Esther tra-
vels to the town in order to see Richard, whose attitude towards life,
the strain of freakishness in his otherwise noble nature, the dark den-
sity that hangs over him, trouble her and make her want to help him.
Over her shoulders Dickens shows us a harbour. There are many ves-
sels there, a multitude of boats that appear with a kind of quiet magic
as the fog begins to rise. (…) Let us pause.  C a n  w e  v i s u a l i s e
t h a t? Of course we can, and we do so with a greater thrill of re-
cognition because in comparison to the conventional blue sea of
literary tradition these silvery pools in the dark sea offer something
that Dickens noted for the very first time  w i t h  t h e  i n n o c e n t
a n d  s e n s u o u s  e y e  of the true artist; saw and immediately put
into words. Or more exactly, without the words there would have
been no vision; and if one follows the soft, swishing, slightly blurred
sound of the sibilants of the description, one will find that  t h e
i m a g e  h a d  t o  h a v e  a  v o i c e  i n  o r d e r  t o  l i v e (id.,
116,  e m p h a s i z i n g  NG).
Other than chauvinistic “theory of the genius” (Romanticism
never entirely left the author of demonic erudite and mastermind
Humbert Humbert), what Nabokov offers here theoretically
amounts to a revelatory connection and  e q u a t i o n  between two
representational media: the image and the word. What connects
them is the dialogical abundance of meaning; intertextual protest
against any purism or determinism of representational institutions.
As Roland Barthes (1977: 38-39) taught us, “all images are poly-
semous: they imply, underlying their signifiers, a ‘floating chain’
of significants, the reader is able to choose some and ignore the
others.” To translate or transform the image into a text hence al-
ways means to “fix” the floating chain; to stop the endless relay of
coherent semiosis. Furthermore, text is necessary to elucidate ima-
ges, but text plays a repressive value – text “tames” the images and
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invests morality and ideology into their meaning (cf. Barthes,
1977: 40). This process Barthes calls “anchorage”. Nabokov’s lec-
tures from the Fifties could not certainly be familiar with any of
the Barthes’ later theoretical constructs, but Nabokov’s insistence
on the ontology of the image bears close resemblance to the post-
structuralist insistence on the permanent ecstasy of finding the
playful,  a c t i v e  meaning of the text:
The poetic or the ecstatic is that in every discourse which can open
itself up to the absolute loss of its sense, to the (non-)base of the
sacred, of nonmeaning, of un-knowledge or of play, to the swoon
from which it is reawakened by a throw of a dice (Derrida 1997:
261).
Nabokov’s interpretative priority is similarly not with the
character, nor the structure or the plot; he despises sociological or
psychological analysis of literary work and he avoids adopting any
of the fashionable literary theories of his time, including close re-
ading. Nabokov understood lecturing on literature to be an ecstatic,
playful, autonomous and idiosyncratic art of persuasion of students
about his own concept of literary value, hence his students most of
the time are, in fact, lacking any other interpretative voices besides
Nabokov’s. No pluralism, but activism: students are invited to de-
velop their own response, understanding and passionate commit-
ment to literature. Nabokov’s apprentices are not learning to be
servants to any academic machinery of interpretation; they are le-
arning to be artists themselves (is that allowed? – I certainly hope
so).
As long as we are still in the company of Dickens, let us men-
tion that Nabokov selected “childhood” as “the striking theme” of
The Bleak House. And regression into interpretative pre-Oedipal
childhood ambivalence/polysemy, as we know from brilliant Va-
dim Linetsky (Linetsky 1996), shapes many of the poststructuralist
analyses, once again leaving Nabokov in the company of Derrida.
Pictorial escapism or childhood regression serve the same purpose:
irresponsible aesthetisation of communicative reality. But Linetsky
relies too heavily on psychoanalysis. In Derrida’s The Truth in
Painting (Derrida 1990 [1978]: 195) artistic images – just as much
as written texts – are not deterministically ambivalent, as Linetsky
would have it, but they show a productive “surplus of meaning”.
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They are always more than ambivalent. In Derrida’s opinion (id.,
110), and he walks in Kant’s footsteps, visual beauty is never free
of “ideas”, since ideas are cognitive ideals by which we understand
the beautiful. Since the beautiful is necessarily judged by inner
criteria, what is art remains morally grounded in the invisible (id.,
116). And this is also how images, Nabokov’s images, become a
guide into the ethics of facing out interior alterity. They are always
translating process between the social laws of “(re)presentation”
and the parergon of the inner “deconstruction”. The dialogism of
their interplay continues to maintain both (or more) positions of
the communicative event and therefore we can not say that Derri-
da’s deconstruction is “childishly unable” to attend any fixed or
“grown-up” perspective. The genre trouble for Linetsky is that
Derrida likes to enumerate and try out “too many” subjective po-
sitions, without accepting to subject himself to only one. And that
is just one of the ways by which Derrida mocks the false security
of interpretative roles we are “supposed” to wear as prescribed by
psychoanalytical guidebook. But now kind Mercury signals I
should really get back on the track of Nabokov’s images.
When talking about Flaubert’s Madame Bovary, Nabokov never
gets too tired to lose sight of the visual details:
And one should not forget that, later, the poisonous arsenic was in a
blue jar – and blue haze that hang about the countryside at her funeral
(Nabokov 1980: 162).
On Flaubert’s iconography:
Another aspect of his style (…) is Flaubert’s fondness for what may
be termed the unfolding method, the successive development of vi-
sual details, one thing after another thing, with accumulation of this
and that emotion.
Robert Louis Stevenson’s treatment will not differ from Flau-
bert’s: the novel The Strange Case of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde is
compared by Nabokov to a detective movie (id., 179) and the pre-
cise hand-drawing of Jekyll/Hyde’s reconstructed “apartment” is
presented to the students. No moral is extracted from the story; Na-
bokov enjoys retelling the plot-game of “hide and seek” in all its
haunting details. Proust enters Nabokov’s book on European wri-
ters without the Dickens-like pomp, but he is probably Nabokov’s
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dearest guest, subjected to extensive quotation after quotation.
Proust’s The Walk by Swann’s Place is compared with the genero-
sity of the dreams (id., 214) and at one point Nabokov draws the
orchid as described by Proust (id., 243). Kafka’s Metamorphosis
gives Nabokov a chance to dazzle his students with zoological
knowledge: judging by Kafka’s description, the beetle that Gregor
Samsa turns into is scholarly discovered to be a flying one. Nabo-
kov, after the usual minutely drawn image of the creature:
Next question: what insect? Commentators say “cockroach”, which
of course does not make sense. A cockroach is an insect that is flat in
shape with large legs, and Gregor is anything but flat: he is convex
on both sides, belly and back, and his legs are small. (…) Apart from
this he has a tremendous convex belly divided into segments and a
hard rounded back that can be expanded and than may carry the be-
etle for miles and miles in a blundering flight. Curiously enough,
Gregor the beetle never found out that he has wings under the hard
covering of his back (id., 258-259).
What follows is the neat and vivid description of all the family
cruelties done to Gregor the insect. Nabokov insists on complete
equality between Kafka’s story and zoological reality:
Gregor, or Kafka, seems to think that Gregor’s urge to approach the
window was a recollection of human experience. Actually, it is typi-
cal insect reaction to light: one finds all sorts of dusty bugs near win-
dowpanes (…) (id., 269).
Fiction is throughout Nabokov’s book placed higher that any
document or real-life testimony; fiction is the realm of presence,
complex order and truthfulness. The last author from Lectures on
Literature, James Joyce, receives by now the classical Nabokovian
interpretative gift: maps upon maps of Bloom’s and Stephen’s tra-
vels around Dublin. Action, time and place are arranged with
scientific logic and precision, as if the reader would end up forever
lost without the exact picture of the front and the back of Bloom’s
house in 7 Eccles Street. Data abounds. Many levels of stylistic pa-
rody are listed. But there is no “explanation”. Works observed re-
mains to be understood as work in constant semantic/interpretative
openness. It is in fact interesting to see Nabokov treating the work
of art as a minutely closed, deterministic and fixed system of
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words and images (any misquotation would amount to fatality),
while at the same time that very work receives the boon of very
indeterministic, open-ended and authority-free interpretation. It is a
productive clash of concepts. The shift into free interpretation is
“paid for” with the absolute respect for the almost bodily confined
“closure” of the textual corpus. Again, saving the texts also means
saving the ethics of respect for the detail.
IV
In my experience of reading Nabokov’s prose in both Russian
and English, his English sentences are much lighter and more co-
vertly humorous than the grave and sardonic tone of his Russian
ones. It is not the matter of difference between the languages, since
there are several Russian writers who are capable of both political
daring and light linguistic playfulness, Pushkin being the master of
that school and Sokolov only his more recent successor, but it is a
result, in my opinion, of Nabokov’s “fortunate” exile and the con-
textual change from Russian metaphysical and political tradition to
English metaphysical and political tradition. As we shall see, no
matter how much Nabokov loved Gogol, he could not help accu-
sing one of his dearest literary ancestors of sacrificing “individual
art” in the name of the “common good”. Here the razor of Nabo-
kov’s criticism of religious  b l i n d n e s s  combines with the criti-
cism of political sightlessness.  W h e n  t h e  e y e  d o e s  n o t
h a v e  a b s o l u t e  f r e e d o m,  b u t  s u b m i t s  t o  a n y
“h i g h e r  v i s i o n”  o r  a n y  c o m p u l s o r y  o b s e r v i n g,  i t
i s  i m m o r a l,  i m p o t e n t  a n d  d a n g e r o u s. Nabokov’s con-
stant disapproval of the deeply castrating, typically Russian cult of
suffering and self-negation (palpable in Orthodox religion as well
as in Communist and Fascist ideology) is, for him, most vivid in
the works of the talented Russian writer Nabokov hated the most:
Dostoevsky. Brilliant parody of both “humiliated heroes” so cha-
racteristic for Dostoevsky and the all-present communist spectral
surveillance is given in the Nabokov’s novel The Eye (Nabokov
1990b [1930]). Not even in death is the Dostoevskian or socialist
hero Smurov freed from internalised persecuting eyes. This is his
final statement:
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I have realized that the only happiness in this world is to observe, to
spy, to watch, to scrutinize oneself and others, to be nothing but a
big, slightly vitreous, somewhat bloodshot, unblinking eye (id., 130).
In other words, it is the huge difference between individualistic
liberalism and mass psychosis of socialism, of which Nabokov
preferred the first, that shaped the works of an artist who much
preferred to look at the Harlequins, than to lower his eyes before
the army officers. I find it extremely fascinating the fact that the
Yugoslav edition of Nabokov’s Lectures on Russian Literature,
translated from English and published during the high socialist era
of the pro-left Yugoslav years (Belgrade 1986), did not include
Nabokov’s essay Russian Writers, Censors and Readers, included
at the beginning of the English edition of the Russian lectures. Nor
did it include any of Nabokov’s other intratextual comments
against the Soviet regime, which abound in the English version.
While we are on the subject of ex-Yugoslavia literary ideology and
Nabokov, even more curious than that is the fact that Aleksandar
Flaker, the most celebrated Yugoslav Slavist, in his book Nomadi
ljepote (Flaker 1988), dedicated to visual aspects of Russian litera-
ture, fails to admit or analyse Vladimir Nabokov’s visual poetics. It
is therefore clear that Flaker, as an expert in Russian literature (but
viewed only from the perspective of the Left), although reporting
on images in Russian modernism, plainly refused to see Nabokov’s
very persistent and strong criticism of Soviet politics. Which gives
a whole new meaning to the politics of the theoretical view and the
analytical eye. It was much more convenient to claim that Nabokov
was an “apolitical” writer. The only book on Nabokov to appear in
Croatian so far, with the deceivingly broad title From Mashenka to
Lolita and written by Magdalena Medarić (1989), readily discusses
only the elements of literary structure in Nabokov’s Russian no-
vels. Not one of his English novels is analysed, and his lectures on
literature are not even mentioned. In the Medarić’s study, ideolo-
gical aspects of Nabokov’s œuvre do not even exist; Nabokov is a
“pure” artist. That kind of ignorance, luckily, never shaped Nabo-
kov’s writings. And here his description of the political as well as
personal hell:
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(…) the Soviet government, the most philistine organisation on earth,
cannot permit the individual quest, the creative courage, the new, the
original, the difficult, the strange, to exist (Nabokov 1981: 8).
So we see that the “mere” individual quest, as usual, is perfectly
capable of political subversion.
V
Nabokov’s Lectures on Russian literature, where the author,
besides novels, also discusses one of Chekhov’s plays and several
other short stories, are no less iconophilic than his lectures on Eu-
ropean writers. Nevertheless, we should emphasize a change in
hermeneutic perspective – on Russian literary ground Nabokov
exercised a more traditional approach: not only are we invited to
analyse the given work, but also to ponder the writer’s biography.
Now even the ever so disliked psychology and sociology (“I hate
tampering with the precious lives of great writers and I hate Tom-
peeping over the fence of those lives”; id., 138) enter the inter-
pretative arena: despite the large warning “Do not watch the pri-
vate life of the poet!” and in spite of Nabokov’s persistent distrust
of social sciences, visually unrestricted Nabokov makes us peep
eagerly into Gogol’s private relationship with the Greek Orthodox
Church. Like some sociology freshman, Nabokov assumes that
Gogol’s “writing impotence” is caused by his religious fanaticism
(id., 43). Then we are introduced to Turgenev’s personal and
literary biography; after which comes Dostoevsky’s portrait –
loaded with “psychological” insights about the writer’s patholo-
gical mental instability (again presented as a path to religious dog-
matism and ur-Fascism; cf. id., 101, 118-119). Tolstoy is spared
the full blow of Nabokovian anti-utopian and anti-socialist cri-
ticism by the sheer fact of “count Leo’s” visual abundance and vi-
sual intelligence, which again leads Nabokov the teacher to draw-
ing: as additional praise of Anna Karenina, Nabokov’s students are
presented with the professor’s drawing of the “costume such as
Kitty wore when she skated with Lyovin” (id., 219) and with the
“tennis costume that Anna wore in her game with Vronsky” (id.,
235). The novel War and Peace is not commented upon. It is pro-
bably too “didactic” for Nabokov’s taste. The last two writers in
the book on Russian and Nabokovian literature are Chekhov and
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Gorky. They are deliberately contrasted. This is evaluation of the
first one:
Chekhov was in the first place an individualist and an artist. He was
therefore no easy “joiner” of parties: his protest against existing
injustice and brutality came in an individual way (id., 246).
Whatever Chekhov lacks in “vividness” (cf. “Thus Chekhov is a
good example to give when one tries to explain that a writer may
be a perfect artist without being exceptionally vivid in his verbal
technique or exceptionally preoccupied with the way his sentence
curves”; id., 252), our professor forgives him because of Che-
khov’s intellectual strength and “deepest human decency” (id.,
253). Nabokov even makes a visual gift to Chekhov by comparing
him with “dim light and the same exact tint of grey, a tint between
the colour of an old fence and that of a low cloud” (ib.). Gorky is
presented as the bottom, the lowest point of the Russian literature.
The decision to include him in the cycle of lectures could have be-
en motivated politically: it was a way of saying that literature is not
beyond the grasp of ideology. On Gorky’s style:
Schematic characters and the mechanical structure of the story are
lined up with such dead forms as the fabliau or the moralité of me-
dieval times. We must note the low level of culture – what we call in
Russia “semi-intelligentsia” – which is disastrous in a writer whose
essential nature is not vision and imagination (which can work won-
ders even if the author is not educated) (id., 305).
What Nabokov cannot stand are always generalia; he insist on
The Specific (cf. “[…]  t h e  a r t  i s  a l w a y s  s p e c i f i c”; id.,
117). And images are the medium able to capture the detail in its
most minute. When we hear Nabokov’s account of Gogol’s vivid-
ness:
The picture starts living a life of its own – rather like that leering
organ-grinder with whom the artist in H.G. Wells’s story The Por-
trait struggled, by means of jabs and splashes of green paint when the
portrait he was making comes alive and disorderly (id., 22),
we are reminded of an ancient attitude that pictures are “divine”;
that they have “power” beyond human measure. Where does Nabo-
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kov get this idea? In his study The Power of Images, David Freed-
berg says:
Painting makes the absent present and the dead living; it aids memory
and recognition; it can inspire awe; it rouses piety; and it transforms
the value of unfigured material (just like sculpture does) (Freedberg
1989: 44).
Freedberg (id., 50) quotes Horace on “what the mind takes
through the ears stimulates it less actively than what is presented to
it by the eyes” and Erasmus “who repeated Aristotle’s view of the
need to regulate paintings and sculptures, on the grounds that
‘painting is much more eloquent than the speech, and often pene-
trates more deeply into one’s heart’.” Similar iconophilia persists
until our times; Gadamer (1975) has chosen to talk about the image
as “the ontological event” of identification. But the main thesis of
Freedberg’s study states that humans adore images because images
have huge emotional impact on them. Moreover, since humans ha-
ve been told repeatedly to repress their emotionality (more often
than not on both the religious and the political grounds), and to
avoid reinstating the  e m o t i o n  a s  a  p a r t  o f  c o g n i t i o n,
images are unfortunately connected with forming a guilt mecha-
nism. But Nabokov is too smart to fall into the described imagi-
nary guilt-trap: he proclaims that Russian literature had been “pur-
blind” before the literary vision of Pushkin and Gogol (Nabokov
1981: 24); he mocks the Greek Orthodox Church “who deplored
the ‘sensuousness’ of his [Gogol’s] images” (id., 41). This is Na-
bokov’s image of Turgenev:
These quotations are good examples of his perfectly modulated well-
oiled prose which is nicely adapted to the picturing of slow move-
ment. This or that phrase of his reminds one of a lizard sun-charmed
on a wall – and the two or three final words of the sentence curve like
the lizard’s tail (id., 69).
And this is the visualisation of Dostoevsky’s novel:
The novel Brothers Karamazov has always seemed to me a straggling
play, with just that amount of furniture and other implements needed
for the various actors: a round table with the wet, round trace of a
glass, a window painted yellow to make it look as if there were
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sunlight outside, or a shrub hastily brought in and plumped down by
a stagehand (id., 104).
When Nabokov describes the pitiful hero from Dostoevsky’s
Memoirs from the Mousehole, he encapsulates the hero’s co-
wardice in the fact that “he could not look into a person’s eyes”
(id., 119).  A v o i d i n g  t h e  g a z e  o f  o t h e r s  therefore beco-
mes a political act of  n o t  f a c i n g  u p  t o  t h e  w o r l d  or to
the fellow humans. All in all, Nabokov’s Russian lectures show a
much higher level of politicisation and incorporated political the-
ory than the English lectures. Ethics of precise description are ano-
ther issue that gets confused with Nabokov’s formalism, but the
surplus of data is the writer’s debt to an almost scientifically atten-
tive observation and precision. It is my view that Nabokov did
n o t  preach the separation of the aesthetic from the ethical; on the
contrary – he never missed the opportunity to paint the destructive-
ness of this disunion. Nor did he separate literature from science.
Nabokov praised the “madness” of “being several” at the same ti-
me (himself being a writer, biologist and a literature teacher). Let
us invite Jacob S. Fisher (Fisher 1999) into discussion and his ac-
count of Derrida, Foucault and Shoshana Feldman’s understanding
of literature as a realm of discursive “madness”. In the circle of
these French philosophers, says Fisher, madness is metaphor for
what is “excluded, invisible, silent, yet always working on the ed-
ges of discourse. It can refer only obliquely – or, rather, figura-
tively – to itself”. In the case of Nabokov, the madness of visual
ecstasy refuses to exclude anything; it borders on myth of total in-
clusion. Contrary to Foucault, who thought that panopticum always
connotes the will for surveillance and control, in Nabokov’s
writing the quest for omnivisuality is a feast of disorder and diso-
bedience; it is impossible to “translate” plural messages of the quo-
ted image of Turgenev as a lizard into some sort of “fixed” theore-
tical frame. This Nabokovian madness, however, remembers, has a
memory, just as much as for Foucault the madness “saved” socially
subversive meanings.
Literature may be a “counter discourse” as Foucault argues, and it
may even constitute a kind of Nietzschean “counter-memory” (…);
but counter-discourse and counter-memory function here exactly as
memory and discourse have always been supposed to function: to
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recover what has been forgotten, to restore what has been lost, to
perpetuate the presence or being of words and things (id., 187).
VI
Nabokov’s Lectures on Don Quijote (Nabokov 1983) repeat the
interpretative methods of two previous books: long quotations
from the novel serve the purpose of detailed visual scanning of the
work in question, and literary characters are, in fact, introduced as
part of Nabokov’s inventory of literature as moving pictures. This
is a summary of how Don Quijote is described:
I have listed Don Quijote’s physical features such as the big bones,
the mole on the back, the iron tendons and the ailing kidneys, his
lanky limbs, his mournful, gaunt, sun-tanned face, his fantastic as-
sortment of rusty arms in the somewhat molish moonlight (id., 27).
The ideal Nabokovian student is described as an “energetic and
excited  s i g h t s e e r” of the fictional scenes, and the professor
paints himself as a “word-happy and footsore guide” (id., 110). Far
from tourism, Nabokov’s eye during the whole literary tour around
Quijote landscapes remains focused on moral and political injusti-
ces, and the more Quijote is mentally and materially humiliated,
the more Nabokov rages. During the journey, Quijote is specified
as “fantastic, lovable madman of genius” (id., 81), comparable to
King Lear and Jesus (id., 73), and both comparisons include physi-
cal, social and political violence performed upon the martyr figu-
res. Nabokov sides completely with Quijote and against “reason”;
at least against “reason” as understood by Foucault or a reason that
became a legitimate means to discipline and punish (read: hurt and
destroy) humans for relying on fiction and play.
Let none think, however, that the symphony of mental and physical
pain presented in Don Quijote is a composition that could be played
only on the musical instruments of the remote past. Nor should any-
one suppose that those strings of pain are twanged nowadays only in
remote tyrannies behind iron curtains. Pain is still with us, around us,
among us (id., 56).
Not really a Nabokov scholar, though a very influential philoso-
pher, Richard Rorty (1995) understood Nabokov as a dubious li-
beral: on the surface opposed to any kind of physical or metaphy-
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sical cruelty, but deeply incapable of understanding that his own
poetics of sharply distinguishing “literary form” from the “literary
content” leads to new epistemological violence. First of all, in all
my readings, I have never come across Nabokov’s separation of
form and content without it having disastrous consequences for the
protagonists involved. Secondly, although Rorty does not discuss
Lectures on Don Quijote, nor does he mention Nabokov’s cult of
images and imaginary, there is a hint of Rortry’s being interested in
the same agenda that shadows this paper as well. Namely, Rorty
claims that Nabokov fits into a cognitive orientation called “idio-
syncratic iconography” and that Nabokov is both believer in “true
art” and, through art, in immortality (id., 167). For Rorty, this is a
sure sign of a pseudoliberal, theological and elitist point of view.
But in my opinion, Nabokov’s  i c o n o p h i l a  never parted from
Nabokov’s  i c o n o c l a s m. It is worth commenting on the notion
of iconoclasm in the sense of Camille Paglia (Paglia 1991: 33).
She marks the way in which images were so often historically pro-
claimed sacrosanct and “pagan”, that every paganism in return
became “eye-intense”. We might add: therefore there is no “theo-
logy” in “images”: images have always been so anti-hierarchical
and hyper-inclusive that regimes of different religions, including
Christianity (Shlain 1998: 71, 80-83, 100-156), Buddhism (id.,
177) and Islam (id., 288), managed to proclaim images as “inhe-
rently dangerous” and “antireligious”. We can hear the echo of sa-
me “arguments” from certain contemporary secular intellectuals,
first among them Jean Baudrillard. For Baudrillard (1993: 194),
images are essentially “immoral” because they mask “the absence
of the real”; they are fakes. But is writing any more “real”? Or
should we go even further and state that a chair is “ethical”, be-
cause it is “real”, and Dürer’s series of self-portraits is “unreal”,
because they are paintings? How could it be that Baudrillard never
distinguished between two particular images, but always, and now
we see Nabokov smilingly nod in agreement, talked about “ima-
ges” in general? If Baudrillard meant that images are immoral
when they become an exclusive substitute for the real experience
(and we have discussed this phenomenon with regards to Na-
bokov’s Mashenka), it still does not mean that all images are al-
ways immoral or that simulacra is per definitionem “evil”. Nabo-
kov proves that images are so essentially connected with emotional
meaning and with ethics of nuanced inner evaluation that they
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cannot be devaluated, suppressed or erased without the significant
damaging of what we could call “whole representational reality”.
Furthermore, Nabokov’s descriptive pedantry of catching the al-
most invisible acts of violence is again a very strong protest against
the “pain” understood only as something reduced to mere physica-
lity. As I have said before, what Nabokov shared with Dostoevsky
was the eye for detecting images of humiliation, but, contrary to
Dostoevsky, Nabokov also had a way of demistifying them into
symptoms we can do something about.
What exactly do these irrational standards mean? They mean the
supremacy of the detail over the general, of the part that is more alive
than the whole, of the little thing which a man observes and greets
with some friendly nod of the spirit while the crowd around him is
being driven by some common impulse to some common goal (Na-
bokov 1980: 373).
This care for the particular places Nabokov inside the tradition
of uncompromised political liberalism. We might add that his per-
sistent interest in psychotic characters and vividness of madness
frees him from further allegations of either politics of snobbery
(there could be no snobbery among lunatics) or of aestheticism of
pure form (madness confuses form and content in more than a
thousand ways). Humbert Humbert is the perfect example of a
tragedy that springs from the psychotic separation of form (visual
obsession with Lolita) and content (Lolita’s feelings and thoughts
out of Humbert’s reach). Nabokov, we obviously must repeat and
repeat, is not Humbert. Criticism that tries to prove that Nabokov
was a moral monster like Kinbote or Humbert Humbert forgets
that literature is not a police dossier; there are no “facts” about Na-
bokov that match the “facts” about Kinbote or John Shade. Lite-
rary fiction may match autobiographical fiction, but that is a whole
new affair. I have no idea who Vladimir Nabokov was, but I can
see that his visual particularism has an ethical and an aesthetic im-
pact; unique both in his literary teachings and in his literary wri-
tings. What we must nevertheless borrow from Rorty (Rorty 1995:
171) is the notion that Nabokov, in his lectures or autobiographical
writings, had not been capable of feeling/expressing any decrease
or loss in personal self-esteem, nor any form of guilt. It is true that
Vladimir Nabokov’s basic mask of subjectivity is the one of the
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all-powerful child/artist, but this is not yet another proof of Nabo-
kov’s egoism or narcissism: it is, rather, an extremely healthy phi-
losophy of love and respect for one’s creative self as a condition of
love and respect for others. What so many readers find so hard to
accept about Nabokov is his sensual delight in art, science, and the
capabilities of the human mind and body. Nabokov says: you don’t
have to be a social, religious, family, professional or psychological
victim; just do what makes you particularly happy. And how could
any thorough and well-rehearsed Christian (or any kind of com-
munist or communitarist) ever forgive him for that?!
VII
What is madness? Is Quijote mad? The  i m a g e s  that he sees,
are they real? Are they moral? Why does Quijote see all that he-
roic, kind and sublime other-realities? Wouldn’t it be better if he
could remember what “common sense” is?
Commonsense has trampled down many a gentle genius whose eyes
delighted in a too early moonbeam of some too early truth; common-
sense has back-kicked dirt at the loveliest of queer paintings because
a blue tree seemed madness to its well-meaning hoof; commonsense
has prompted ugly but strong nations to crush their fair but frail
neighbours the moment the gap in history offered a chance that it
would have been ridiculous not to exploit (Nabokov 1980: 372).
I agree that commonsense is absolutely the worst teacher of lite-
rature, since literature is the madness of being an other. Nabokov
says: “[L]et us bless the freak; for in the natural evolution of
things, the ape would perhaps never have become man had not a
freak appeared in the family” (ib.). As Oedipus the Freak, Nabokov
refuses to blind himself, because he believes one could practice
self-criticism with eyes wide open and one could share the glaze
with (his/her own) monsters or criminals and thereby understand
them. I think Nabokov hated Freud for the same reason that De-
leuze and Guattary (Deleuze; Guattari 1990 [1972]) refuted him: it
is not fair to submit all unlimited production of strangeness to the
universal paternal trauma called the “Oedipal complex”. The story
of Oedipus is far more fertile than the interpretation psychoanalysis
suggests. While still on the subject of singular and plural gazes, I
Nataša Govedić258
would like to quote the anti-castrative art historian and visual theo-
rist Donald Kuspit:
Malignant artistic and intellectual narcissism, involving a “consistent
attempt to exploit, destroy, symbolically castrate, or dehumanise si-
gnificant others”, that is, faciliative cultural others – others with ex-
pressive (re)creative gazes – has become almost de rigeur in today’s
postmodern academics (Kuspit 1996: 311).
VIII
I suggest we part with the question about the eye’s imaginary
gender. Is Nabokov so fond of images because he is that proto-
typical “aggressive misogynist male” who, through gaze, controls
and objectifies the world and women around him? Or is he a good
ironist, who mocks the very same chauvinism his characters art-
fully enact? As Steven Bruhm says:
In the specifically heterosexual memories of Speak, Memory, women
are either isolated and presented for their particular, individuating
characteristics (see for example page 86), or all collapse synecdo-
chicly into the idea of one: “all would merge to form somebody I did
not know but was bound to know soon” (Nabokov 1969: 213). These
aspects of narcissistic remembering, what Nabokov ultimately calls
“a bothersome defocalization” (id., 240) that we might as easily at-
tribute to Ovid’s Narcissus,  e i t h e r  i s o l a t e  o r  e r a s e  f e -
m a l e  s u b j e c t i v i t y  a l t o g e t h e r, whereas the passage descri-
bing male tutors moves in and out of male subjective space (Bruhm
1996: 299).
Furthermore, Bruhm (id., 300) is ready to conclude that Na-
bokov’s aesthetic “is delicately homosexual”. I absolutely agree,
but how about acknowledged psychological and sociological data
that proves that we all are “delicately homosexual” and that there
are no “clear cuts” between gender identities (cf. Butler 1993)? So
the question becomes: Why do we want to erase contradictions of
sexual identity, or: How are we dealing with the multitude of
passions we are capable of? Do we pretend we don’t have them, or
do we face them with all the frightening power of recognition we
have? This is again the Oedipal dilemma in a nutshell. And if we
cannot repress polymorphous sexuality, if she continues to ma-
nifest in our lives, do we punish ourselves for that (Oedipus), or do
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we pay attention to her and present her with different – imaginary –
gender performances (Nabokov)? It seems to me that Nabokov was
a very passionate man:
Obsession is, of course, a recurrent theme in Nabokov’s work, be it
the Humbertian lust for Lolita, the Kinbotean passion for John Sha-
de’s text, or Martin Edelweiss’s ultimately fatal desire to impress So-
nia in Glory (Stowe 1999: 67).
Helmuth Plessner (Plessner 1994 [1983]: 25) suggested diffe-
rentiating between two kinds of passions: one that enlarges our
personality and enhances our inner abilities (through passionate
devotion and learning about something), and the other that reduces
us to slavery and loss of identity (because it is so escapist and ad-
dictive that we lose both ourselves and our freedom because of it).
Nabokov had a lot to say about both kinds. His lectures on li-
terature and Ada certainly explore Plessner’s “life-enhancing pas-
sion”, while many other novels deal with perils of obsession and
its enormous energy of deceit. Here we may also find a reason why
the visual and sensual pleasures Nabokov explores in his work are
not easy to explain/classify. We have no problems in detecting his
public hostility towards the idea of intellectual equality between
genders, visible in his lecture on Jane Austin. But there are pro-
blems in deciding what kind of cultural gender Nabokov has cho-
sen for himself when he emphasised the very poetics of visuality
and particularity. In his book The Alphabet Versus the Goddess:
The Conflict Between Word and Image (Shlain 1998), Leonard
Shlain insist that images, because they are holistic, simultaneous,
concrete and synthetic, have always been culturally connected with
feminine creativity. Its cognitive complement is the masculine
world of words, the alphabet, abstract and sequential thinking that
“selects” and thereby produces hierarchies, linearity and authority
of the Revealed Word. History, moreover, has been written by men
who preferred Word to Image. And Nabokov is not one of them.
This leads us to doubt twice as strongly the idea that gaze is
“immanently” male. As for Oedipus, couldn’t we say that this hero
of Western civilisation “in committing regicide, patricide, and in-
cest, became ‘the slayer of the distinctions’, has abolished dif-
ferences and thus contravened the mythical order” (Lauretis 1984:
119)? Could it be that abolished differences also include the break
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in gender distinctions? With Nabokov’s eyes, we are also out of
any “structural” order, because they do not divide the reality into
proper/improper, high/low, past/present, image/word, mind/body,
etc. In such eyes, a particular “image” is much more semantically
rich than any set of “ideas” associated with it. Ideas, as Derrida has
shown earlier, are possible frames for understanding images, but
images still have their silent ways to mingle out of the abstract
petrifications. The same is true for images in both poetry and
visual arts. The final example, by Nabokov:
One of the many reasons why the very gallant Russian poet Gumilev
was put to death by Lenin’s ruffians thirty odd years ago was that
during the whole ordeal, in the prosecutor’s dim office, in the torture
house, in the winding corridors that led to the truck, in the truck that
took him to the place of execution, and at that place itself, full of
shuffling feet of the clumsy and gloomy shooting squad,  t h e  p o e t
k e p t  s m i l i n g (Nabokov 1980: 376-377).
Nobody who ever received the gift of this image, who formed
the inner picture of Gumilev’s smile, will never forget it, no matter
how the theoretical or ideological or philosophical interpretations
turn out.
In the Oedipal world of identity attained through victimhood or
self-punishments, the eye that refuses to blind itself is the eye that
never lost connection with his/her imaginary power. As a result,
we now have Nabokov’s I/eye and Nabokov’s art, not the eternal
Oedipal fear of images. We see without guilt.
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